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THE CASE FOR RACE: AN EXPLORATION OF
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES OLYMPIC AND
PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE CAN REQUIRE
ATHLETES TO SIGN AWAY THEIR RIGHT TO
PROTEST
“It wasn’t done for a malignant reason. It was only done to bring
attention to the atrocities of which we were experiencing in a country that
was supposed to represent us.” – Tommie Smith, U.S. Olympic Gold
Medalist.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Olympic Games have always been an inherently political
affair—established to bring the world together through sport.2 As such,
and perhaps inadvertently, the games have been a venue for political
protest for almost as long as they have existed in their modern form.3 Just
ten years after the modern Olympic Games began in 1896, Peter O’Connor,

See
Walter
Ford,
It’s
progress,
THE
UNION
(Jun.
12,
2020),
https://www.theunion.com/sports/walter-ford-its-progress/.
2 See
INT’L OLYMPIC COMM.,
OLYMPIC CHARTER
8,
¶
2
(2021),
https://stillmed.olympics.com/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-OlympicCharter.pdf?_ga=2.234634012.303326392.1633619797-1409196676.1632857194 (establishing
Fundamental Principles of Olympism). The Charter states that “the goal of Olympism is to place
sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a
peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.” Id. The most recent
Olympic games in Tokyo showcased the intersection between sports, peace, and politics when a
Russian and a Ukrainian athlete, rivals from two warring countries, hugged each other as they
medaled in the high jump, while their government exploited the event. Vladimir Mozgovoi, How
Russia and Ukraine Became Smear Campaign Champions, THE MOSCOW TIMES (Aug. 11, 2021),
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/08/11/how-russia-and-ukraine-became-smear-campaignchampions-a74755.
3 See Jessica Phelan, 7 of the most memorable Olympic protests in history (and one that
could
be),
SALON
(Feb.
13,
2014,
5:50
PM),
https://www.salon.com/2014/02/13/7_of_the_most_memorable_olympic_protests_in_history_and
_one_that_could_be/ (summarizing protest history at Olympic Games); David Davis, Olympic
Athletes
Who
Took
a
Stand,
SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE
(Aug.
2008),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/articles/olympic-athletes-who-took-a-stand-593920/
(providing overview of 1968 Olympic protest); M. . .lissa Godin, Athletes Will Be Banned From
Protesting at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. But the Games Have a Long History of Political
Demonstration, TIMES MAGAZINE (Jan. 14, 2020, 12:19 PM), https://time.com/5764614/politicalprotests-olympics-ioc-ban/ (discussing protests at Olympics and use of Olympics as venue or tool
of protest).
1
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an Irish track and field athlete, was forced to compete for Great Britain
during the Irish fight for independence.4 In response to his new status as a
British athlete, O’Connor scaled a flagpole during his medal ceremony and
waved a green flag reading “Ireland Forever” in Gaelic.5 The 1968
Olympic Games in Mexico City were the venue of similar protests by Věra
Čáslavská, a Czechoslovakian gymnast who went into hiding when the
Soviet Union invaded her country.6 After winning four gold and two silver
medals, Čáslavská turned her head from the Soviet flag in protest of the
Soviet Union’s invasion.7 While the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) did nothing in response to this specific act, Čáslavská was unable to
coach or take any part in the world of gymnastics until the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991.8
John Carlos and Tommie Smith, two American track and field
athletes, protested at the medal ceremony for the two hundred meter sprint
by raising their fists in a black power salute during the Star-Spangled
Banner.9 Their protest was in response to the Civil Rights Movement, the
continuing war in Vietnam, and the assassinations of Martin Luther King,
Jr. and Robert Kennedy.10 The IOC took immediate action, suspending
Carlos and Smith from the American team and sending the pair back to the
states.11 While the lives and careers of these athletes were upended
4 See Phelan, supra note 3 (describing O’Connor’s protest); Godin, supra note 3 (describing
O’Connor’s protest and background surrounding his status as British athlete).
5 See Godin, supra note 3 (“In protest, O’Connor scaled a 20-foot flagpole in the stadium,
waving a green flag with the words ‘Erin Go Bragh’ (Ireland forever) while his co-athlete Con
Leahy distracted Greek authorities.”) Though the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”)
frowned upon O’Connor’s actions, it did not expel him or place him on probation, and he went on
to win gold in three more competitions, waving a green flag each time. Id.
6 See Phelan, supra note 3 (describing Čáslavská’s protest); Godin, supra note 3 (describing
the background and consequences of Čáslavská’s protest).
7 See Phelan, supra note 3 (recounting Čáslavská’s protest). Čáslavská was present in her
native Czechoslovakia when the Soviet Union invaded and was forced to go into hiding, training
from home rather than at the state sponsored gymnasium. Id. “She kept in competition form by
practicing her floor routine in fields and swinging on tree branches instead of the parallel bars.”
Id. The Soviet flag went up during Čáslavská’s medal ceremony because she tied with a Soviet
gymnast for the gold. Id.
8 See Godin, supra note 3 (detailing Čáslavská’s life after 1968 Olympics).
9 See Davis, supra note 3 (describing Carlos and Smith’s protest); Phelan, supra note 3
(providing background on Carlos and Smith’s protest); Godin, supra note 3 (explaining protest’s
impetus).
10 See Davis, supra note 3 (describing protest’s impetus and historical background); Godin,
supra note 3 (explaining protest’s impetus and historical background). Both American runners
took off their shoes to symbolize Black poverty and wore one black glove to represent African
American strength and unity. Phelan, supra note 3. Additionally, Smith wore a black scarf for
Black pride while Carlos wore a string of beads to show respect for the victims of lynching.
Phelan, supra note 3.
11 See Phelan, supra note 3 (describing consequences for Carlos and Smith after protest).
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because they took a stand for their beliefs, there has never been
consequences for a nation that chooses to boycott the Olympic Games. 12
This discrepancy reveals the IOC’s unbalanced approach in preventing the
Olympics from being used for political purposes—the politically motived
actions of athletes are punished, while the politically motivated actions of
nations are effectively ignored.13
Protests by athletes are not specific to the Olympics, as
professional athletes in the United States have protested at games in their
own respective leagues.14 In 2016, San Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin
Kaepernick knelt during the national anthem to protest police brutality and
racial inequality in the United States, sparking a movement that spread
through all United States professional sports.15 Kaepernick’s protest caught
the ire of the Republican Party and then-Republican presidential nominee
Donald Trump, who called the act disrespectful, un-American, and an
attack on veterans and service members.16 Informal pressure from
conservative consumers and commentators, as well as then-President
See Davis, supra note 3 (noting difficulties Carlos faced after protest). Carlos struggled to
find a stable job and even attributed the suicide of his then-wife, in part, to the backlash from his
protest. Id.; see also Phelan, supra note 3 (noting instances of nation boycotts). Sixty nations,
led by the United States, boycotted the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow in response to the 1979
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which then resulted in a sixteen-nation boycott of the 1984
Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Phelan, supra note 3; DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F.
Supp. 1181, 1188 (D.D.C. 1980), aff’d without opinion, 701 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding
USOC entitled to refuse to allow American athletes to compete, even for reasons unrelated to
sport); Oren Weisfeld, Olympics bans political protest by athletes, NOW MAGAZINE (Jan. 22,
2020), https://nowtoronto.com/news/olympics-2020-tokyo-protests/ (noting IOC’s reaffirmation
of commitment to ban athlete protest).
13 See Weisfeld, supra note 12 (noting IOC commitment to ban athlete protests); DeFrantz,
492 F. Supp. at 1188 (endorsing USOC refusal to participate in Olympic Games).
14 See Adam Kilgore & Ben Golliver, Most sports leagues pause with second day of protests,
some more unified than others, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2020, 7:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/08/27/sports-protests/ (noting teams across the
NBA, NHL, and NFL all canceling games due to protests). The cancelled games were a response
to the shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and, more generally, police brutality
following the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer in 2020. Id.
15 See Tadd Haislop, Colin Kaepernick kneeling timeline: How protests during the national
anthem started a movement in the NFL, SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/colin-kaepernick-kneeling-protesttimeline/xktu6ka4diva1s5jxaylrcsse (providing comprehensive timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s
activism). Initially, Kaepernick protested by sitting on the bench instead of standing during the
national anthem during a preseason game. Id. Kaepernick got the idea to kneel, rather than sit,
from former Seahawks player and Green Beret Nate Boyer. Id. When Kaepernick kneeled for
the first time on September 1, 2016, he was joined by teammate Eric Reid, who continued to
kneel with him for the entire season. Id.; see also Trump Calls NFL kneeling ‘disgraceful,’
disrespectful to veterans, FOX NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trumpcalls-nfl-kneeling-disgraceful-disrespectful-to-veterans (quoting President Trump’s views on
athlete activism).
16 See FOX NEWS, supra note 15 (quoting President Trump).
12
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Trump, resulted in the National Football League (“NFL”) announcing a
rule penalizing players who kneel during the national anthem.17 Despite
the new rule, President Trump continued to criticize the NFL, sparking
more protests from players and greater outcry from fans.18 Americans
remain divided in their views on athlete protests, and the act of kneeling
during the national anthem has remained at the center of the controversy.19
This note analyzes the United States Olympic and Paralympic
Committee’s (“USOPC”) previous policy of barring athlete protest during
sanctioned events and seeks to prove that this action was unconstitutional. 20
While the USOPC does not currently enforce this policy, the risk of
reversal warrants careful consideration of this issue. 21 Athletes who choose
See Haislop, supra note 15 (explaining NFL’s locker room rule).
See id. (examining developments in dialogue surrounding Kaepernick’s protest). Nike
used Kaepernick as the face for a new ad campaign supporting his activism, which was met with
applause as well as the widespread burning of Nike products. Id.
19 See Michael Tesler, Americans Are Far More Likely To Support Athlete Protests Than
They
Once
Were,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Sept.
3,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-are-far-more-likely-to-support-athlete-proteststhan-they-once-were/ (showing statistical change over time in favorability of protest by athletes);
see also Amy Tennery, NFL: Political divide on athlete activism widens in the U.S. –
Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-football-nfl-activism/nflpolitical-divide-on-athlete-activism-widens-in-the-u-s-reuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKBN2602MX
(Sep. 9, 2020, 12:22 PM) (reviewing statistics underscoring partisan divide over athlete protest).
Kneeling during the national anthem is still hotly debated and support for the act is incredibly
partisan. Id.; Oren Weisfeld, Race Imboden: ‘I knelt because America doesn’t reflect me
anymore’,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Sep.
1,
2020,
5:00
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2020/sep/01/race-imboden-fencing-anthem-protest-interview
(interviewing Race Imboden regarding his decision to kneel on Olympic podium during national
anthem).
20 See Eddie Pells, Pan Am Games protestors each get 12 months of probation, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/80b2fb3ee1da43c8909cb7b6a1a47454
(discussing sanctions, contract signed, and initial public statement).
21 See Associated Press, USOPC won’t punish athletes for protesting at the Olympics, ESPN
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.espn.com/olympics/story/_/id/30489589/usopc-punish-athletesprotesting-olympics (announcing USOPC’s refusal to sanction athletes for kneeling or raising
fists at future games). A reversal of this policy is possible, given that Rule 50 remains under the
IOC Olympic Charter, and the IOC has consistently defended its enforcement. Id.; Dave Zirin &
Jules Boykoff, The USOPC Defends Olympic Athletes’ Right to Protest, THE NATION (Dec. 23,
2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/olympics-protest/. It should be noted that the
USOPC’s new policy states that they will not punish athletes that protest “peacefully and
respectfully . . . in support of racial and social justice for all human beings.” Zirin & Boykoff,
supra note 21. This suggests that the USOPC retains the right to sanction athletes who do not
protest within those categories. Id.; see also Ariane de Vogue & Devan Cole, Supreme Court—
over John Roberts’ sole dissent—rules in favor of student in First Amendment case, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/08/politics/supreme-court-free-speech-college-religion-case-chikeuzuegbunam/index.html (Mar. 8, 2021, 11:20 AM) (detailing decision allowing First Amendment
suit where university could reestablish anti-speech policy). The potential for a policy reversal is
enough to warrant intervention by the courts—especially where constitutional freedoms are
abridged. Vogue & Cole, supra note 21. This uncertainty was apparent during the Tokyo Games
17
18
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to protest at future Olympic Games or international competitions should be
allowed to do so freely, without retribution from the USOPC, or the IOC
acting through it.22
II. FACTS
The IOC was established in 1894 as an independent, international
organization, with the role of overseeing the Olympic Games and
international sport competitions, reviewing bidding processes, facilitating
the growth of sport and sportive collaboration around the world, and
promoting the political neutrality of the Olympic Movement.23 This
dedication to political neutrality is stated in Rule 50 of the Olympic
Charter, the “codification of the fundamental principles of Olympism, and
the rules and bye-laws adopted by the International Olympic Committee.”24
Rule 50 itself bars any “kind of demonstration or political, religious, or
racial propaganda . . . in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas.” 25 To
ensure adherence to Rule 50, the IOC relies on the National Olympic
Committees to evaluate infractions and dole out consequences to their own
athletes instead of imposing the sanctions itself.26

as fencer Race Imboden and shot-putter Raven Saunders protested from their respective podiums.
Matthew Futterman, et al., Shot-Putter’s Gesture Renews Controversy Over Podium Protests,
NEW YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/01/sports/olympics/olympics-protestspodium.html (Aug. 5, 2021). This led to confusion over the enforcement of Rule 50, with the
IOC and USOPC both stating that the other would handle any potential disciplinary action. Id.
22 See Pells, supra note 20 (discussing USOPC and Imboden fall out).
23 See Overview, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM. (July 10, 2021), https://olympics.com/ioc/overview
(providing IOC historical overview); History, Principles & Financing, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM.
(July 14, 2021), https://olympics.com/ioc/mission (stating IOC mission); OLYMPIC CHARTER,
supra note 2, at 8 (stating IOC’s role is “to maintain and promote its political neutrality and to
preserve the autonomy of sport.”)
24 See
Olympic
Charter,
INT’L
OLYMPIC
COMM.
(July
14,
2021),
https://olympics.com/ioc/olympic-charter (republishing IOC Charter).
25 See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 2, at 94 (barring athlete activism); see also IOC
ATHLETES’
COMM.,
RULE
50
GUIDELINES
1-3,
https://stillmedab.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2020/01/Rule50-Guidelines-Tokyo-2020.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2020, 9:26 AM) (explaining purpose of Rule
50 and how infractions are evaluated). Notably, Rule 50 bars any protest on the field of play, in
the Olympic Village, during medal ceremonies, and during the opening, closing, or other official
ceremonies. IOC ATHLETES’ COMM., supra note 25, at 2. However, it permits protests during
press conferences, at team meetings, and through digital and traditional media platforms. Id.
Ostensibly, Rule 50 bars protest where it would have the largest effect—where it reaches the
largest audience. Gwen Berry, I Used the Podium to Protest. The Olympic Committee Punished
Me., THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sep. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/opinion/gwenberry-olympics-protest.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage.
26 See IOC ATHLETES’ COMM., supra note 25, at 1-3 (explaining Rule 50 purpose and
infractions).
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The USOPC, the IOC’s American counterpart, was initially
established as the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”), and is a
federally incorporated and chartered, independent organization. 27 Founded
in 1978, the USOC served as the coordinating and governing body for all
amateur athletic activity directly related to international competition.28 As
such, it deals directly with, and follows the rules of, the IOC–including the
IOC’s infamous Rule 50.29 The USOPC has the power to enforce IOC
rules through its incorporating statute, and its constitution and by-laws give
it full authority over the eligibility and sanctioning of athletes.30
In the lead up to the 2019 Pan-American Games, the USOPC
required all its competing athletes to sign a contract promising not to
violate Rule 50 by taking part in political demonstrations during the
games.31 In spite of this contract, American Olympic foil fencer Race
Imboden took a knee on the medal podium after the U.S. Men’s Foil Team
won gold.32 In addition to breaching his contract, his protest ran afoul of
Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter.33 In response to his protests, the USOPC
See Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220502(a) (incorporating
USOC).
28 See 36 U.S.C. § 220502(a) (incorporating USOC); 36 U.S.C. § 220502(c) (renaming
USOC as USOPC); 36 U.S.C. § 220503(2) (establishing USOPC’s purposes).
29 See 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (stating USOPC purposes); OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 2, at
94 (barring athlete activism); see also Zirin & Boykoff, supra note 21 (detailing USOPC change
in Rule 50 adherence).
30 See 36 U.S.C.S. § 220505 (creating the USOPC as an independent, federally chartered
organization); 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3), (8) (stating USOPC authority over eligibility and disputes
involving American athletes); see also 36 U.S.C. § 220502 (incorporating the USOPC); 36
U.S.C. §§ 220501-220529 (showing entire act); 36 U.S.C.S. § 220505(a) (establishing that “the
corporation shall adopt a constitution and bylaws,” that it “may amend”).
31 See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 2, at 94 (barring any “kind of demonstration or
political, religious or racial propaganda . . . in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas.”);
OlympicTalk, Race Imboden kneels, Gwen Berry raises fist on Pan Am Games podium, NBC
SPORTS (Aug. 11, 2019, 11:59 PM), https://olympics.nbcsports.com/2019/08/10/race-imbodenfencer-national-anthem-protest-knee/ (stating that “before competing, Pan Am Games athletes
commit to terms including refraining from political demonstrations.”)
32 See Los Angeles Times Staff and Wire Reports, U.S. Fencer Race Imboden kneels on
podium to protest injustice and Trump, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 10, 2019, 9:44 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2019-08-11/american-fencer-kneels-over-social-injusticeblasts-trump (explaining reasons behind Imboden’s Pan-American protest); Derrick Bryson
Taylor, U.S. Fencer and Hammer Thrower Lead Silent Protest at Pan-American Games, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/sports/race-imbodenfencer-kneels.html (detailing Imboden’s specific protest motivations). Imboden tweeted that he
was motivated to kneel by the “shortcomings” of his country, most notably “racism, gun control,
mistreatment of immigrants, and a president who spreads hate.” Taylor, supra note 32. He
further stated that he wanted to use his moment at the top of the podium to “call attention to
issues” he believed needed to be addressed. Id.
33 See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 2, at 94 (barring demonstrations or protests);
OlympicTalk, supra note 31 (noting Race violated promise not to protest).
27
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issued a statement of disapproval.34 The USOPC then sent Imboden a letter
informing him that he was being put on a twelve-month probation whereby
another infraction would result in his ineligibility to compete in the 2021
Tokyo Olympic Games.35 In early 2020, the IOC reaffirmed its fullthroated adherence to Rule 50.36 This affirmation came under the guise of
promoting harmony and preventing “divisive disruption” during the
games.37 The guidelines released by the IOC clarified that “kneeling,”
specifically added as an example, would not be allowed as a form of protest
on medal podiums.38
Following summer 2020’s Black Lives Matter movement, and the
election of President Joe Biden, the USOPC suddenly reversed its decision,

See Los Angeles Times Staff and Wire Reports, supra note 32 (quoting USOPC’s Vice
President of Communications Mark Jones’s statement). “In this case, Race didn’t adhere to the
commitment [not to protest] he made to the organizing committee and the USOPC . . . [w]e
respect his rights to express his viewpoints, but we are disappointed that he chose not to honor his
commitment. Our leadership is reviewing what consequences may result.” Id.
35 See Associated Press, Race Imboden and Gwen Berry get probation for Pan Am Games
podium
protests,
NBC
SPORTS
(Aug.
20,
2019,
6:56
PM),
https://olympics.nbcsports.com/2019/08/20/race-imboden-gwen-berry-podium-protests-pan-amgames/ (noting USOPC’s initial response to the protests); Des Bieler, U.S. Fencer Race Imboden
given 12-month probation for Pan Am Games protest, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2019,
12:05 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/08/21/us-fencer-race-imboden-givenmonth-probation-pan-am-games-protest/ (further detailing USOPC sanctions); Pells, supra note
20 (quoting from USOPC probation notices for Imboden and Berry). Sarah Hirshland, CEO of
the USOPC, stated in her letter to Imboden:
34

“It is also important for me to point out that, going forward, issuing a reprimand to
other athletes in a similar instance is insufficient . . . We recognize that we must more
clearly define for Team USA athletes what a breach of these rules will mean in the
future . . . Working with the (athletes and national governing body councils), we are
committed to more explicitly defining what the consequences will be for members of
Team USA who protest at future Games.”
Id. (emphasis added). Hirshland further stated that she respected the perspectives of the athletes
and would work with the IOC “to engage on a global discussion on these matters,” but noted that
she could not “ignore the rules or the reasons they exist.” Id. While Hirshland’s letter
acknowledged that a more clearly defined punishment is required, it did not indicate that the
USOPC was willing to break with its own tradition and allow its athletes to protest in any
capacity. Id.
36 See IOC ATHLETES’ COMM., supra note 25 (identifying “hand gesture or kneeling” as
explicit examples of barred protest).
37 See id. (clarifying IOC guidelines on Rule 50).
38 See Tom Schad, IOC: No kneeling or any form of political protest allowed at Tokyo
Olympics,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
9,
2020,
11:11
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2020/01/09/tokyo-olympics-ioc-details-athleterules-political-protests/4419120002/ (discussing reposting of guidelines); see also Andrew Keh,
Olympics Allows Protests, but Not During Events or on Medal Stands,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/sports/olympics/olympics-protests-tokyo.html (Aug. 6,
2021) (noting prohibition against protesting on podium remains intact under new guidelines).
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renouncing its policy against athlete activism so long as protests were
“peaceful” and “respectful.”39 However, the USOPC retains the ability to
unilaterally reverse its position again.40 Were this to occur, any athlete
exercising their constitutional right to free speech from the podium would
be stripped of their eligibility to compete.41
III. HISTORY
To establish that the Constitution bars the USOPC from
conditioning the benefit of participation on waiving the right to protest, an
athlete must prove that: (1) the USOPC functions as a state actor or has
taken a state action; (2) the athlete exercised their constitutionally protected
right to free speech; and (3) the USOPC, as a state actor, conditioned the
benefit of competing on the athlete’s waiver of the right to exercise their
constitutionally protected right to protest.42
A.

Federally Chartered Corporations as State Actors and State Action

The question of whether the USOPC is a state actor was first
addressed in DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Committee.43 In 1980, under
considerable pressure from the United States government, the USOPC
(then the USOC) boycotted the Moscow Games in response to the Soviet

See Associated Press, supra note 21 (noting previous policy reversal); Zirin & Boykoff
supra note 21 (establishing USOPC will not punish athletes who protest “peacefully and
respectfully . . . in support of racial and social justice for all human beings.”) Without further
guidance, the USOPC effectively establishes itself as the sole arbiter of what constitutes peaceful
or disrespectful protest. Zirin & Boykoff, supra note 21. Further, there is no indication that the
USOPC cannot reverse its policy, nor any explanation of the distinctions it has placed on how
athletes can protest and for what causes. Id.
40 See Pells, supra note 20 (describing USOPC’s original policy on athlete protest);
Associated Press, supra note 21 (noting USOPC’s policy reversal); see also de Vogue & Cole,
supra note 21 (discussing Supreme Court allowing First Amendment case due to concern
university could reestablish anti-speech policy).
41 See Pells, supra note 20 (describing USOPC’s original policy on athlete protest); see also
de Vogue & Cole, supra note 21 (discussing Supreme Court allowing First Amendment case due
to concern university could reestablish anti-speech policy).
42 See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1192-94 (D.D.C. 1980), aff’d,
701 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing the USO[P]C and corporations as state actors); see
also Thomas R. McCoy, Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, The First Amendment
Encyclopedia, THE FREE SPEECH CENTER: FIRST AMENDMENT NEWS AND INSIGHTS FROM
MTSU, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1026/unconstitutional-conditions-doctrine
(last visited Nov. 2, 2020, 10:07 AM) (outlining unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
43 DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1192 (analyzing whether USO[P]C is a state actor or committed
state action in boycotting Moscow Olympics).
39
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Union’s 1979 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.44 Twenty-five
athletes and one USO[P]C Executive Board Member sued the USO[P]C to
challenge the decision not to send American athletes to the 1980 Moscow
Olympics.45 The plaintiffs claimed that the USO[P]C’s action to boycott
the games constituted a “governmental state action” that abridged their
rights of “liberty, self-expression, personal autonomy and privacy” as
guaranteed by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.46
In evaluating the plaintiff’s argument, the court addressed two
issues: (1) whether the USO[P]C’s decision was a state action; and (2)
whether the USO[P]C’s decision “abridged any constitutionally protected
rights.”47 The court looked to two cases when determining whether the
USO[P]C committed a state action: Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.48
and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 49 Under Burton, the Court asked
whether the state had “so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [the private entity] that [the entity] must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”50 While the
44 See id. at 1183-84 (discussing factual background). The United States levied sanctions
against the Soviet Union and requested a boycott of the games in Moscow, which the USO[P]C
initially resisted. Id. In response to the USO[P]C’s resistance, President Carter announced in his
State of the Union address that he did not support sending a “United States team to compete in the
Olympic Games as long as the Soviet military forces remained in Afghanistan.” Id. at 1184. The
House of Representatives and the Senate followed suit by issuing resolutions opposing
participation. Id. Pressure mounted on the USO[P]C as White House counsel met with USO[P]C
executives and officers. Id. White House counsel threatened to terminate federal funding and
revoke the USO[P]C’s tax-exempt status unless the USO[P]C complied and voted to boycott the
games. Id. President Carter went so far as to tell the Athlete’s Advisory Council that the United
States would not send a team and sent a message to USO[P]C threatening legal action to enforce
his decision to boycott the games. Id.; see also Dionne L. Koller, How the United States
Government Sacrifices Athletes’ Constitutional Rights in the Pursuit of National Prestige, 2008
BYU L. REV. 1465, 1481-82 (2008) (summarizing facts under DeFrantz).
45 See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1182 (describing plaintiffs’ claim that “that in preventing
American athletes from competing in the Summer Olympics, defendant has exceeded its statutory
powers and has abridged plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”)
46 See id. at 1182, 1185 (identifying plaintiffs and listing plaintiffs’ claims). Additionally,
plaintiffs asserted claims that: (1) the USO[P]C violated its own governing statute by acting in a
political manner; and (2) the USO[P]C breached its own Constitution, Bylaws and governing
statute by violating the rights of a plaintiff-member of the Executive Board. Id. at 1185.
47 Id. at 1192 (stating two-pronged test for constitutional claim against private entity). The
USO[P]C was a federally chartered, but private, organization. Id. As such, the plaintiffs had to
show that the USO[P]C vote to boycott was a governmental act, or state action, as understood
through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
48 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
49 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp at 119394 (explaining precedent and analyzing claim).
50 See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193 (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 725) (stating Burton
inquiry). In Burton, the Supreme Court had found that a restaurant that discriminated on the basis
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Supreme Court found that the private entity in Burton committed a state
action, the D.C. Circuit declined to do so for the USO[P]C. 51 In its
opinion, the court noted that there was no evidence of a “symbiotic
relationship” between the government and the USO[P]C, outside of the
funds Congress used to establish the USO[P]C and the fact that its
incorporating statute requires the USO[P]C to submit an annual report to
the President and Congress.52 The court then held that there was no
“obvious” or “deep enmeshment of the defendant and the state” because the
“USO[P]C receive[s] no federal funding and exists and operates
independently of the federal government.”53
Under Jackson, there is a governmental action only when there is a
“sufficiently close nexus” between the state and the challenged action. 54 In
Jackson, the Supreme Court held that the defendant-utility committed no
state action, even though it was closely regulated by the state and the action
about which the plaintiff complained was approved by the state’s utility
commission.55 In DeFrantz, the plaintiffs’ argued that the Carter
Administration’s persuasion campaign had crossed the line from
“governmental recommendation” to “affirmative pressure, [putting] the
government’s prestige behind the challenged action.”56 The D.C. Circuit
disagreed, holding that the USO[P]C’s decision failed the Jackson test
because the federal government was not required to approve any USO[P]C
action.57 The court also quoted Spark v. Cath. Univ. of Am.,58 reasoning
that, at least where race is not involved, “it is necessary to show that the
Government exercises some form of control over the actions of the private
of race had committed a state action. Burton, 365 U.S. at 717. The restaurant was physically and
financially an integral part of a public building that was built and maintained by public funds, was
devoted to a public parking service, and was owned by the state of Delaware. Id. at 717-18. The
Court reasoned that this interdependence between the private and state entities was sufficient to
classify the private entity as a state actor. Id.
51 See Burton, 365 U.S. at 726 (finding restaurant committed state action); see also
DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193 (declining to recognize USO[P]C as state actor).
52 See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193 (stating reasoning behind USO[P]C’s rejection as state
actor).
53 See id. (rejecting Burton framework for USO[P]C).
54 See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (stating “the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193
(quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351) (noting Jackson standard).
55 See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 346, 358-59 (stating defendant-utility regulated by state but
holding state not sufficiently connected to defendant’s conduct). The action that led to the
litigation was the defendant’s procedure for terminating electrical services. Id. at 347; DeFrantz
492 F. Supp. at 1193 (noting Jackson holding).
56 See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193 (reciting plaintiff’s argument).
57 See id. (holding USO[P]C not a state actor under Jackson).
58 Spark v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C.Cir. 1975).
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party.”59 Since there was no issue of racial discrimination, and the
USO[P]C was not required to obtain approval from the federal government,
the decision not to send an American team to the Moscow Olympics was
not a state action.60
DeFrantz is not the only case that called into question the
USO[P]C’s status as a state actor.61 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
in S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. held that the USO[P]C was not a state actor,
but not without garnering a notable dissent from Justice Brennan.62 Justice
Brennan’s dissent rested on the belief that “‘when private individuals . . .
are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature,
they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and are subject to its
constitutional limitations.’”63 This argument is particularly relevant in
situations where the function of the individual is traditionally within the
government’s “‘exclusive prerogative.’”64 Brennan concluded that the
USO[P]C may be classified a government actor because it represents the

59 DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1194 (quoting Spark, 510 F.2d at 1281-82) (stating Spark alters
Jackson framework when race is involved).
60 See id. at 1194 (holding USO[P]C’s actions nongovernmental). The court found that the
USO[P]C is an independent organization without per se or de facto government control. Id. The
court further reasoned that nothing in the governing statute gives the federal government control
and noted that the decision to boycott was decided by the USO[P]C’s House of Delegates via
secret ballot. Id. The court also stated that while the federal government may bar athletes from
competing in the Olympics, it did not exercise its power in pressuring the delegates to vote a
certain way. Id. The court explained that to find otherwise would “open the door” into a nonjusticiable realm where courts would have to decide what “level, intensity, or type of
‘Presidential’ or ‘Administrative’ or ‘political’ pressure” on a private entity is enough to trigger
federal jurisdiction. Id.
61 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 525 (1987)
(discussing San Francisco corporation attempting to use “Olympic” for private event under Fifth
Amendment). The incorporating statute of the USO[P]C gave it sole commercial and
promotional use of the word “Olympic” and Olympic symbols, as well as the ability to grant their
use. Id. at 526. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. argued that this policy violated their First Amendment
right to free speech. Id. The Court disagreed, finding that the USO[P]C was not a state agent and
therefore the plaintiff’s claim must fail. Id. at 546-48.
62 See id. at 548-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (outlining Justice Brennan’s dissent). Brennan’s
dissent was joined by Justices Marshall, O’Connor and Blackmun. Id. at 548; see also id.
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“. . . for the reasons explained by Justice Brennan . . . I believe the
[USOC] and the United States are joint participants in the challenged activity and as such are
subject to the equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment.”)
63 See id. at 549 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299
(1966)) (emphasizing government’s role in endowing entities with powers and related
consequences).
64 See id. at 549-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)) (stating USOC’s powers flow from Congressional action).
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United States during the Olympics, which is a nationalistic event that the
government often utilizes as a tool of foreign policy.65
While DeFrantz and S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. addressed the scope
of the USO[P]C’s general powers, Olympians have yet to litigate the
USO[P]C’s powers when it comes to restrictions on their First Amendment
freedoms. 66 The court affirmed the USO[P]C’s general powers regarding
athlete participation in Barnes v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n.,67 where it
noted that Congress intended for disputes regarding eligibility to be
decided outside the judicial system.68 While the infringement on the First
Amendment rights of athletes has not yet been addressed, precedent set out
under Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan69 indicates that organizations working
on behalf of the government may face constitutional litigation.70

65 See id. at 549-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating Congress granted USO[P]C powers to
develop amateur athletes and represent America).

The USOC is . . . our country’s exclusive representative to the International Olympic
Committee (IOC), a highly visible and influential international body. The Court
overlooks the extraordinary representational responsibility that Congress has placed on
the USOC. As the Olympic Games have grown in international visibility and
importance, the USOC’s role as our national representative has taken on increasing
significance.
Although the Olympic ideals are avowedly nonpolitical, Olympic participation is
inescapably nationalist. Membership in the IOC is structured not according to athletes
or sports, but nations. The athletes the USOC selects are viewed, not as a group of
individuals who coincidentally are from the United States, but as the team of athletes
that represents our Nation . . . Every aspect of the Olympic pageant, from the
procession of athletes costumed in national uniform, to the raising of national flags and
the playing of national anthems at the medal ceremony, to the official tally of medals
won by each national team, reinforces the national significance of Olympic
participation.
Id. at 550-551; see also Koller, supra note 44, at 1469-86 (explaining history of sportive
nationalism and athletics as foreign policy).
66 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 525-27 (discussing “Olympic” copyright);
DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1182-86 (D.D.C. 1980) (discussing
Olympian participation rights).
67 Barnes v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 862 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D. W. Va. 1993).
68
See id. at 1544 (citing Michels v. U.S.O.C., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984)) (outlining
legislative history of Ted Stevens Act). The plaintiffs in DeFrantz sued for their right to compete
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as well as their right to self-expression
under the First Amendment. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1182-86. The plaintiff in S.F. Arts &
Athletics., Inc. sued for the right to use the term “Olympic” under the Due Process Clause and
First Amendment. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 525-27 (reciting causes of action).
69 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
70 See id. at 71 (highlighting organizations acting on state’s behalf are not exempt from
constitutional claims).
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Free Speech Considerations

For a state agent to be held liable for the deprivation of an
individual’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff must first show that they
were prevented from exercising such a right.71 Historically, a citizen’s
right to protest has been protected under the First Amendment’s Free
Speech clause.72 The test used to determine whether conduct, like an act of
protest, is considered speech was formulated under Spence v. Washington,73
where the Supreme Court analyzed conduct through a two-pronged test: (1)
whether there was an intent to convey a particularized message; and (2)
whether, in the surrounding circumstances of the conduct, the likelihood
was great that the message would have been understood by those who saw
it.74 This test works in tandem with the holding from Tinker v. Des
Moines,75 where the Supreme Court ruled that “symbolic speech,” such as
an act of protest, is protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
as if it were “pure speech.”76 The two-prong framework established by
Spence would likely be applied to protests mounted by American athletes
seeking to express themselves during the Olympic Games.77

See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (explaining conduct must deprive plaintiff
of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”)
72 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (delineating test for when
conduct is communicative and therefore protected); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (noting symbolic speech, akin to pure speech, protected
under First and Fourteenth Amendments); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”)
73 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
74 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11 (articulating test for classifying conduct as speech). In this
case, the appellant had used removable tape to superimpose a peace symbol onto an American
flag and hung it from his apartment window. Id. at 405-06. The flag was hung in protest of the
invasion of Cambodia and the recent killings at Kent State University. Id. at 408; see also
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 (holding flag burning, as conduct, entitled to First Amendment
protections).
75 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
76 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06 (holding wearing of armbands akin to pure speech and
protected conduct). The Court notes that wearing black armbands to protest the War in Vietnam
was “. . . entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct,” effectively
undermining the school’s argument that in restricting speech it was trying to maintain order. Id.
at 505.
77 See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1741-45 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (exhibiting recent conduct as speech example).
71
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Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine bars the government, or
any state actor, from conditioning a benefit on the exercise of a
constitutional right.78 In many cases involving the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the government has conditioned a benefit, such as
federal funding, or a privilege, like tax exemption, on a party’s
relinquishment of their freedom of speech.79 For example, in Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington,80 the Supreme Court held that
denying tax deductions to a lobbying non-profit was not a violation of the
First Amendment.81 Additional examples include Rust v. Sullivan,82 where
the Supreme Court allowed the government to subsidize certain services
over others in the promotion of particular forms of family planning, and

See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (striking down requirement for
veterans to swear oath of loyalty for veteran’s property-tax exemption); Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
597 (1972)) (noting “government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a
constitutional right”); Fed. Commc’n Comm’n. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 402 (1984) (barring government from conditioning funds on station’s relinquishing right to
editorialize); Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (holding government
cannot create private speech and then try to restrict it); McCoy, supra note 42 (stating overview
of unconstitutional conditions doctrine); see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64
(1963) (holding commission’s pressure on book sellers to stop selling “objectionable” books
unconstitutional); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177 (1991) (allowing HHS to limit ability of
Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities). “The Government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to
deal with the problem in another way.” Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
79 See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518-519 (stating “the denial of a tax exemption for engaging in
certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the
proscribed speech.”); League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 402 (barring government from
conditioning funds on station’s relinquishing right to editorialize); McCoy, supra note 42 (“The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is encountered most often . . . where an express or implied
term in [a] contract restricts the contractor’s freedom to speak . . . . [and] . . . the contractor
[seeks] to invalidate the contractual restriction . . . on the grounds that it is an unconstitutional
condition on the availability of the valuable government contract.”); cf. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 408 U.S. at 551 (allowing Congress, by statute, to bar public grants to
charitable organizations for lobbying purposes); Rust, 500 U.S. at 194-95 (holding Government
can selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities in public interest). The Supreme
Court held that there is no distinction between a benefit or a privilege, like in Speiser, where a
California state law required veterans to swear an oath of loyalty to the government to continue
receiving their property-tax exemption, equating privileges and benefits with respect to the
doctrine. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518-19.
80 Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
81 See id. at 545 (quoting Perry, 408 U.S. at 597) (stating “government may not deny a
benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.”)
82 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
78
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Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,83 where the Supreme Court invalidated
a restriction on a legal services organization’s ability to challenge the
constitutionality or validity of laws pertaining to indigent clients.84
Notably, this doctrine does not apply if the “restriction is reasonably
necessary for the effective performance of the contract,” such when secrecy
is required, or an employee is engaged in government-specified speech.85
If the doctrine does apply, then a court would automatically apply the strict
scrutiny standard of review to see if: (1) the state has a compelling interest
in restricting the speech; and (2) the action is narrowly tailored enough to
achieve that interest.86 A compelling state interest is defined as something
necessary or essential to the function or interests of the government, rather
than a matter of choice, preference, or discretion.87 In the event that the
USOPC is deemed a state actor, and an athlete’s podium protest, like
Imboden’s, is considered free speech, that athlete could likely find redress
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.88

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 549 (2001).
See Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. at 540 (demonstrating
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as applied to nonprofit’s conditional tax deductions); Rust,
500 U.S. 173 (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine to government subsidies); Legal
Services Corp., 531 U.S. 533 (showing unconstitutional conditions doctrine consequences when
examining restrictions on LSC).
85 See McCoy, supra note 42 (first citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-10
(1980); then citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 193). In Snepp, the Supreme Court upheld a CIA
employment contract that required a former CIA analyst to submit his manuscript regarding CIA
activities in South Vietnam to the agency for prepublication review, as a way to screen for
classified materials. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507-10. Similarly, in Rust, the Court found that the
Department of Health and Human Services could fund family-planning services under the
condition that fund recipients did not engage in abortion-related activities, such as counseling,
communicating, suggesting, or performing abortions. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. The Court further
noted that selectively funding a specific program, and not an alternative program, was not
viewpoint discrimination, but rather the government’s own prerogative. Id.
86 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 172 (2015) (exemplifying seminal Frist
Amendment case explaining strict scrutiny evaluation requirements). Under a First Amendment
strict scrutiny analysis, “narrowly tailored” means that the restriction is neither under-inclusive—
so riddled with exceptions that the restriction does not actually achieve the state’s interest—nor
over-inclusive—so broad that it leaves no other way for someone to express themselves.
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 452-54 (2015) (defining narrowly tailored analysis
contours); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (holding barring protests is
specifically understood as content-based restriction).
87 See Ronald Steiner, Compelling State Interest, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/31/compelling-state-interest (last visited Jan. 22,
2021, 4:20 PM) (discussing what constitutes compelling governmental interests). Examples of
compelling government interests include government regulations that are “vital to the protection
of public health and safety,” the “requirements of national security and military necessity,” and
“respect for fundamental rights.” Id.
88 See McCoy, supra note 42 (laying out requirements for claims under unconstitutional
conditions doctrine).
83
84
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IV. ANALYSIS

While it is unclear whether the USOPC will reverse its position,
the threat of such a reversal and its previous enforcement is enough to
allow a suit to go forward.89 Such a reversal would be unconstitutional,
and the discretion to do so should be taken out of the hands of the
committee. 90 Race Imboden’s protest, a prime example of athlete activism,
will serve as the fact pattern for this analysis since his actions ran afoul the
previous policy, and would inevitably violate a reversal.91 This analysis
seeks to prove: (1) that the USOPC is a state actor; (2) that by kneeling,
Race Imboden exercised his protected constitutional right of free speech;
and (3) that as a state actor, the USOPC conditioned the benefit of
competing on Race Imboden’s signing away of his right to exercise a
constitutionally protected right.92
A.

The USOPC is a State Actor

The USOPC should be constitutionally barred from conditioning
Olympic participation on the relinquishment of an athlete’s First
Amendment rights because the USOPC is a state actor.93 The court in
DeFrantz offered two approaches for deciding whether a private actor’s
conduct constituted a state action: the nexus test from Jackson and the

See Associated Press, supra note 21 (detailing USOPC decision not to sanction athletes
who protest at Tokyo Games). The reversal of the previous policy was sudden and came after the
USOPC had affirmed its conviction against changing the policy. Zirin & Boykoff, supra note 21.
See de Vogue & Cole, supra note 21 (detailing decision allowing First Amendment suit where
university could reestablish anti-speech policy); Futterman, et al., supra note 21 (detailing
protests by Saunders and Imboden, and IOC-USOPC fallout over enforcement).
90 See sources cited supra note 31 and accompanying text (stating USOPC’s actions
regarding Rule 50).
91 See sources cited supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing Imboden’s actions and
resulting consequences).
92 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing right to free speech); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(prohibiting states from making or enforcing laws that curtail First Amendment rights without
due process); DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1192-94 (D.D.C. 1980)
(noting USOPC a private organization despite being federally chartered); McCoy, supra note 42
(providing brief unconstitutional conditions doctrine overview); OlympicTalk, supra note 31
(reviewing facts from Imboden’s protest and USOPC precautionary and reactionary measures).
93 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 557-59 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing for profound connection between USO[P]C and U.S.
government); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974) (explaining nexus requirement between government and private actors to create
state action). The DeFrantz court ultimately found that the USO[P]C’s decision not to send
athletes to the Moscow Games was not a state action. DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1194.
89
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symbiosis test from Burton.94 It is unlikely that a plaintiff could prove that
the USOPC is a state actor under the Burton test, as the committee operates
independently from the federal government and takes no direct federal
funding for its maintenance, governance, or function.95 It is more likely
that a plaintiff would prevail under the Jackson test, which asks whether
the federal government is functionally interdependent with the alleged state
actor.96
The court in DeFrantz incorrectly ruled that there was not a
sufficient nexus between the state and the USOPC.97 While it is true that
the federal government has no authority to approve or reject USOPC
committee actions, this does not mean that the USOPC is insulated from
the pressures of the government.98 The federal government can exert
control over an entity in a variety of different ways, and while the court
noted that the state did not retain any veto power over the committee’s
actions, it is insufficient to merely ask whether the government had the
direct ability to dictate the USO[P]C’s decision to boycott the Moscow
Olympics.99 For example, President Carter announced in his State of the
Union address that he would not support sending American athletes to the
games, and the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions
opposing participation in the games.100 These resolutions threatened the
USO[P]C’s tax exemption status and federal funding, undoubtedly

94 See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1192-94 (laying out precedents); see also Jackson, 419 U.S.
at 351 (establishing nexus test); Burton, 365 U.S. at 725 (establishing symbiosis test).
95 See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193 (applying Burton test). The court distinguished the
USO[P]C from the restaurant in Burton, which was “physically and financially an intregal part of
a public building, built and maintained with public funds, devoted to a public parking service, and
owned and operated by an agency of the State of Delaware for public purposes.” Id. The
USO[P]C, on the other hand, receives “no federal funding” and “exists and operates
independently of the federal government.” Id. While the USO[P]C is required to submit yearly
reports on diversity and participation to Congress and the President, this was not enough to
convert an “an independent relationship to a ‘joint participation.’” Id.
96 See id. at 1193 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351) (outlining Jackson nexus test).
97 See id. at 1193-94 (holding there must be some government control when race is not at
issue). The court referenced Spark v. Cath. Univ. of Am.’s assertion that it is “necessary to
show . . . [the] government [exercising] some form of control” where “race is not involved.”
Spark v. Cath. Univ. of Am, 510 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (D.C.Cir. 1975).
98
See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193-94 (discussing plaintiffs’ novel arguments and why
they fail nexus test); see also Koller, supra note 44, at 1481-82 (discussing plaintiffs’ argument
surrounding insulation).
99 See Koller, supra note 44, 1481-82 (listing actions taken by the United States government
to force compliance, and USOPC resistance); see also DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193
(summarizing plaintiffs’ argument).
100 See Koller, supra note 44, at 1481-82 (outlining USOPC’s resistance to number of
government actions); see also DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193 (summarizing plaintiffs’
argument).
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influencing its decision.101 The White House also threatened legal action to
enjoin the committee, told the Athlete’s Advisory Council that the United
States would not send a team, and directed the USO[P]C Executive Board
and its officers to vote for a boycott.102
The USOPC is not insulated from the pressures of the government,
nor could it be, as it performs a traditionally governmental role.103 Justice
Brennan’s dissent in S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. emphasized that the Court’s
majority failed to see the interdependence between Congress and the
USO[P]C, noting that § 110 of the Amateur Sports Act’s infringement on
non-commercial speech violated both the spirit of the law and the
Constitution as an overbroad restriction on free speech.104 The dissent
further argued that the USO[P]C should be considered a governmental
actor for two reasons: (1) it performs an important governmental function;
and (2) there exists a significantly close nexus between the government and
the challenged action by the USO[P]C. 105 Regarding the first argument,
Justice Brennan noted that the powers given to the USO[P]C are “endowed
by the State” and “governmental in nature,” making it an agency or
instrumentality of the state and therefore subject to “constitutional
limitations.” 106 Those “distinctive, traditional government function[s]”
included: exclusively representing the United States to the IOC and at the
Olympics; training and developing amateur athletes; and serving as its own
administrative and adjudicative body—something that is usually reserved

101 See Koller, supra note 44, at 1481-82 (demonstrating attack on tax exemption and federal
funding).
102 See Koller, supra note 44, at 1481-82 (listing actions taken by United States government
forcing compliance, and USO[P]C resistance); see also DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1184
(discussing influential government actions).
103 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 548-64 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting separately) (recognizing USO[P]C and government as
“joint participants” in regulating use of “Olympic,” and discussing USO[P]C’s public role). The
USO[P]C sued an athletics club in San Francisco over its use of the word “Olympic” when it
promoted the “Gay Olympic Games”—an athletic contest “rivaling” the real Olympic Games—
which would be paid for with promotional merchandise displaying the name. Id. at 525.
104 See id. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (outlining reasoning for finding government
action); see also 36 U.S.C.S. § 220506 (granting USOPC exclusive rights to word “Olympic”).
105 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)) (listing reasons why USO[P]C should be
considered state actor).
106 See id. at 549 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (providing governmental powers argument).
Justice Brennan is careful to note that a definition covering all regulated businesses would be too
broad, and that actions by a private entity that “serves the public,” are not necessarily
governmental in nature. Id. (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 354). Brennan instead references Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966), Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), and Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), stating that a private entity endowed with powers or functions
that are governmental in nature should be treated as state actors. Id.
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for ministries of sport and culture in foreign nations.107 Brennan further
argued that the USO[P]C should be considered a state actor under the
Burton framework because the government and the USO[P]C each garners
a financial or prestigious benefit from the other.108 Additionally, Brennan
opined that, to the public, there is no distinction between the decisions of
the government and the USO[P]C. 109 He reasoned that athletes literally
wear, carry, and salute the national flag throughout the entirety of the
games, as well as figuratively represent American values on the
international stage.110
By examining the legislative history of the incorporating act,
Justice Brennan’s dissent highlights why the court’s treatment of the
USO[P]C as a non-state actor was misguided, while respecting the ultimate
ruling in DeFrantz.111 Looking at the USOPC’s status as a state actor
strictly from a free speech perspective would avoid the holdings in Barnes
and Spark, all while affirming the committee’s strict autonomy in the realm
of athlete participation.112 Imboden’s protest can be distinguished from
these rulings because it does not pertain to pure athlete eligibility, but
rather to how and whether one may exercise their right to free speech.113
Spark should be distinguished from the case at hand because forcing a
litigant to show that there is some actual level of government control
misinterprets the logical conclusion of DeFrantz and Barnes—that athletes
were barred from private action in court to decide eligibility in order avoid
107 See id. at 550-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining USO[P]C’s governmental
functions). The USO[P]C was created following a Commission on Olympic Sports, which was
established to investigate the deteriorating rate of performance by Americans at the Olympics and
to suggest possible solutions. Id. at 553-54. Much like an administrative agency, the USO[P]C’s
powers are accompanied by several public checks, such as: (1) the inability to amend its
constitution or by-laws; (2) the inability to recognize a new national governing body without both
a public hearing and notice to all interested parties; and (3) a requirement to submit annual reports
to the President and Congress on expenditures, operations, activities, and accomplishments. Id. at
554-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparing USO[P]C to administrative agency).
108 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 556-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (applying
Burton precedent to USO[P]C).
109 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (advocating for application of Burton test).
110 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 556-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing for
application of Burton test); see also 36 U.S.C.S. § 220506 (proscribing exclusive rights to the
USOPC).
111
See Barnes v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n., 862 F. Supp. 1537, 1544 (S.D. W. Va. 1993)
(citing Michels v. U.S.O.C., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984)) (noting Congress’s removal of
provision allowing athletes private action in federal court regarding competitive eligibility).
112 See id. (demonstrating Congressional intent for athletes not to have right to private action
for participation); see also DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, 492 F. Supp. 1181,
1194 (D.D.C. 1980) (citing Spark v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (1975)) (stating
that without race factor there must be some government control).
113 See Spark, 510 F.2d at 1281-82 (illustrating holding); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1182,
1194 (summarizing facts and determining USOC’s action not state action).
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an explosion of litigation by spurned would-be Olympians as opposed to an
actual Olympians litigating for constitutional rights. 114 Adhering to the
ruling in DeFrantz ignores the possibility that the court was equally
affected by the sentiments of the federal government, namely, that allowing
athletes to compete at the Moscow Games might have given the Soviets the
impression that the Invasion of Afghanistan was “of no consequence.”115
When considering the holdings of Spark, Barnes, and DeFrantz
within the proper context, a court could reasonably apply the Jackson test
to the current facts while examining them through Justice Brennan’s
dissent in S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc.116 The USOPC’s former decision to
sanction United States Olympic Athletes was informed by guidance from
Rule 50 in the Olympic Charter.117 However, while the IOC can sanction
athletes itself, its Charter does not give it the power to force governing
bodies to sanction their own athletes, so those sanctions must come from
the USOPC.118 The federal government has its prestige abroad, and the
USOPC has the financial incentive to retain viewership, as American
political figures and the American public put sustained pressure on the
USOPC to either recognize or ban athlete activism.119 Pressure from the
government and the public would have been high under the Trump
administration, as going against the President of the United States and the

114 See Barnes, 862 F. Supp. at 1544 (citing legislative history); see also Spark, 510 F.2d at
1281-82 (illustrating holding); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1182, 1194 (summarizing facts and
determining USO[P]C did not commit state action).
115 See Koller, supra note 44, 1483-85 (arguing DeFrantz decision must be put into Cold
War context). The Olympic Movement in the United States stood in stark contrast to the Soviet
model—while the private sector groomed and nurtured amateur athletes in the West, the Kremlin
and its State Committee for Sports and Physical Education of the USSR developed the athletes of
the Soviet east. Id. Such a contrast was likely known by the judges and, given the context of the
1970s, it is reasonable to suspect that they supported the West’s approach. Id.
116 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 559 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (highlighting USO[P]C’s state-oriented role); see also Spark, 510 F.2d at
1281-82 (indicating need for government control absent issues regarding race); Barnes, 862 F.
Supp. at 1544 (citing legislative history); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1182, 1194 (articulating case
facts and holding that USOC’s action not state action).
117
See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 2, at 94 (stating rule 50).
118 See Zirin & Boykoff, supra note 21 (noting uncertainty regarding who decides what is
“peacefully and respectfully,” especially when IOC still opposes athlete protest); see also
OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 2, at 94 (determining Olympic Charter does not confer power
compelling governing bodies to sanction their respective athletes).
119 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 559 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (demonstrating
USO[P]C imbued with “prestige” of the United States); see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 64 (1963) (holding commission’s pressure on book sellers to stop selling
“objectionable” books unconstitutional).
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Republican Party could result in a financial catastrophe.120 This kind of
mollification of the government is analogous to the compliance of the
USO[P]C in DeFrantz in their boycott of the Moscow Games.121 At the
very least, this situation should be distinguished from the holding in
DeFrantz because, here, a plaintiff would be suing under their First
Amendment right to free speech as opposed to the right to compete.122
Such a distinction would account for the overall ruling in DeFrantz and the
legislative intent of the incorporating act, but prevent the USOPC from
barring athletes from competing by attaching eligibility to the
relinquishment of a constitutionally protected right.123 In this way, a court
could update the holding in DeFrantz and apply the holding of Bantam
Books, Inc., where governmental pressure was declared unconstitutional
under the First Amendment.124 In combining Bantam Books, Inc., with
Justice Brennan’s dissent in S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., a court could find
that the pressure exerted by President Trump, Congress, and the
Republican Party, would leave the USOPC no choice but to cave to its own
financial interest.125 It can be inferred that the USOPC’s initial actions
were meant to pacify the government, by the fact that the reversal of their
policy came after President Biden was confirmed to be the next president,
sufficiently demonstrating the nexus between the state and the challenged

120 See Haislop, supra note 15 (exemplifying President Donald Trump railing against athlete
protest); Tesler, supra note 19 (showing statistical change over time favoring athlete protest);
Tennery, supra note 19 (illustrating statistics underscoring partisan divide over athlete protest).
121 See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1183-86 (illustrating case facts).
122 See id. at 1185 (listing plaintiffs’ causes of action). The plaintiffs were suing for their
right to compete under their rights to “free expression,” “privacy,” and personal autonomy under
the First, Fifth, Ninth Amendments, respectively. Id. The court ultimately found was that there
was no constitutional right to compete in the Olympics, but did not address an athlete’s
constitutional right to protest. Id. at 1194-95; see also Bieler, supra note 35 (illuminating facts
surrounding Imboden’s protest and sanction).
123 See Bylaws of the United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee §§ 9.2-9.10 (effective
June 18, 2020) [hereinafter USOPC 2020 Bylaws] (granting USOPC exclusive control over
eligibility and participation of athletes); Barnes v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n., 862 F. Supp.
1537, 1544 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (citing Michels v. U.S.O.C., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984))
(providing legislative history of incorporating act); DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1194-95
(announcing case holding).
124 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 (1963) (holding pressure intended to
restrict book shops’ constitutional rights to sell books freely).
125 See S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 549-61 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining Brennan’s analysis and conclusion that USOPC is a state
agent); Bantam Books, Inc., 372 U.S. at 64 (exemplifying unconstitutional government pressure);
see also Koller, supra note 44, at 1481-82 (demonstrating actions taken by federal government
encouraging boycott); Tennery, supra note 19 (showing statistics underscoring partisan divide
over athlete protest).
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action.126 If not for the Trump administration’s position on athlete
activism, which encouraged society’s polarized view of activism, it is
likely that the USOPC may not have taken action against Race Imboden,
who specifically chose to kneel during the National Anthem—a
recognizable form of protest in 2019.127
B.

Race Imboden’s Protest was Speech

In Texas v. Johnson,128 the Court wrote that “[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable,” and that same bedrock principle ought to
apply to protests by athletes.129 The test to determine whether Imboden’s
actions on the podium constitute speech is straight forward.130 In applying
the Spence precedent, a court must first determine whether Imboden had
the intent to convey a particularized message.131 Imboden clearly stated
that he wanted to convey the message that the current state of America did
not represent him, despite actively representing his country on the
international stage as a fencer.132 Imboden’s kneeling was also a direct
response to police brutality and the rampant gun violence spreading across
the United States at the time.133 Given that Imboden expressly said that he
wanted to convey a message, it is likely that a court would find that there
was an intent to convey a particularized message.134
See Associated Press, supra note 21 (reversing prior decision barring Olympic Games
protest); Pells, supra note 20 (focusing on USOPC’s original position and probational sanction
against Imboden); Futterman, et al., supra note 21 (detailing Saunders and Imboden protests, and
IOC-USOPC fallout).
127 See Associated Press, supra note 35 (detailing USOPC’s sanctions on Imboden).
128 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
129 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (describing flag-burning as offensive).
While Imboden did not burn an American flag, it is likely that many Americans would have
viewed kneeling during the national anthem as “disagreeable,” if not outright “offensive.” Tesler,
supra note 19.
130 See Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (stating test for non-verbal conduct);
OlympicTalk, supra note 31 (reviewing Imboden’s actions).
131 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11 (holding “intent to convey a particularized method” as
first prong in analysis).
132 See id. at 408 (stating that Spence “felt there had been so much killing and that this was
not what America stood for. [He] felt that the flag stood for America and [he] wanted people to
know that [he] thought America stood for peace”); Weisfeld, supra note 19 (explaining why
Imboden knelt on the podium).
133 See Weisfeld, supra note 19 (explaining Imboden’s actions through interview and
tweets).
134 See Weisfeld, supra note 19 (stating why he knelt on the podium); Spence, 418 U.S. at
408 (discussing Spence’s desire to convey a message).
126
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Next, a court must determine whether the circumstances
surrounding the act make it likely that the message would have been
understood by those who viewed it.135 Because Imboden was an athlete
kneeling during the national anthem at the Olympics, it is safe to assume
that most Americans would understand that Imboden was protesting by
linking him, at least tangentially, to Colin Kaepernick and the kneeling
movement Kaepernick started.136 Similar to the defendant in Spence,
Imboden’s form of protest would have been clearly recognized as a
commentary on either the Black Lives Matter movement or in response to
the two mass shootings in El Paso, Texas, and Dayton, Ohio, which
occurred in the week leading up to Imboden’s event.137 If the USOPC
understood it to be a form of protest, as demonstrated through the sanctions
imposed after the act, then it is probable that any spectator would
understand that Imboden was protesting.138 It is likely that a court would
find the Spence test satisfied and that Imboden was participating in
speech.139
C.

The Contract Violated Athletes’ Constitutionally Protected Rights

If the USOPC is a state actor, and Imboden’s protest is classified as
protected speech under the First Amendment, then the contract
conditioning eligibility to compete on the relinquishment of a right to
protest is a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.140 The
overarching maxim of the doctrine is that the “government may not deny a
benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right[,]” which is
See Spence, 418 U.S. at 411 (articulating second prong of analysis).
See Haislop, supra note 15 (illustrating Kaepernick’s protest timeline and the social
movement he started); see also OlympicTalk, supra note 31 (discussing Imboden kneeling).
137 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 406 (describing the peace symbol the defendant taped to the
American flag). Anyone in the 1970s would have immediately understood Spence’s action to be
a direct commentary on the Vietnam War. Id. See Weisfeld, supra note 19 (noting Imboden’s
reasons for kneeling).
138 See Los Angeles Times Staff and Wire Reports, supra note 32 (quoting USOPC’s Vice
President of Communications Mark Jones’s statement); see also IOC ATHLETES’ COMM., supra
note 25, at 2 (identifying kneeling as a form of barred protest).
139 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11 (stating test). It should be noted that not all speech is
protected, but none of the scenarios that protract the realm of free speech (danger; incitement of
violence; hate speech) apply here and that while the actions of the USOPC could be found
unconstitutional at this point through an analysis of a content based restriction this note instead
chooses to focus on the actual contract athletes had to sign as the act to be overturned, rather than
the bylaws of the USOPC. See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 2, at 94 (stating rule 50); see also
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163-64 (2015) (developing seminal case showing that
free speech restrictions demand strict scrutiny analysis); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 312-16
(1988) (detailing seminal case explaining content based restrictions).
140 See McCoy, supra note 42 (providing overview unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
135
136
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exactly what the USOPC attempted to do in Lima. 141 The contracts that the
USOPC forced its athletes to sign stated that they could not protest at the
Pan American Games without risking their Olympic eligibility—a direct
threat to deny the benefit of competing should they exercise their
constitutional right to free speech.142 The USOPC could argue that the
contract did not contain restrictions as to specific types of speech and
actions, and that the committee allows for protest at other points during
Olympics, just not during opening, closing, or medal ceremonies, or in
specific areas.143 However, the most meaningful kind of protest would
occur on the medal podium, where an athlete has the ability to show the
world what they believe with the greatest effect.144 It is likely that a court
would find that the USOPC specifically conditioned the privilege of
participant eligibility on the relinquishment of one’s First Amendment
rights, thus violating the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and forcing to
the court to apply a strict scrutiny analysis to Imboden’s situation.145
In defense of its position, the USOPC could reference cases such as
Rust v. Sullivan, where the court ruled that a state actor may choose not to
promote one view or opinion instead of another, or Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, where the court held that viewpoint-based funding decisions
could be sustained where the government is a speaker, or where the
government uses private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its

141 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); Los Angeles Times Staff and Wire
Reports, supra note 32 (acknowledging that there was an agreement entered into between athletes
and the USOPC).
142 See McCoy, supra note 42 (providing overview of unconstitutional conditions doctrine);
Los Angeles Times Staff and Wire Reports, supra note 32 (showing terms of contract). Through
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the analysis can again be distinguished from DeFrantz,
as here the constitutional right being abridged is that of speech, in the First Amendment, and not
“expression” under the First Amendment—which, conceded, was meritless—or the right to
compete under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. See DeFrantz v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1183-84 (D.D.C. 1980) (describing what plaintiffs
were seeking relief under). Note, also, that just because the benefit being denied is a privilege
does not mean that the denial is not an infringement, nonetheless. See Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (striking down California requirement for veteran loyalty oath to receive
Veteran’s property-tax exemption).
143 See Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. at 545 (holding that Congress
had made specific conditions on funds not to be used to lobby state legislatures) (emphasis
added).
144 See Berry, supra note 25 (countering argument that protest is allowed elsewhere during
the Olympics).
145 See Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. at 549 (affirming if
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is violated, strict scrutiny must apply); see also McCoy,
supra note 42 (providing unconstitutional conditions doctrine analysis overview).
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own programs.146 These exceptions would be misplaced, however, as the
USOPC did not choose to promote one view over another, but rather sought
to bar a certain type of speech. 147 Additionally, the USOPC did not speak
through its athletes, nor request that they transmit information pertaining to
their own program, and such an interpretation would broaden the
exceptions of Legal Services Corp. beyond reason.148 This argument fails
to comport with the direct holding of Legal Services Corp., as the USOPC
could be argued to have created private expression through the
development and participation of athletes, and subsequently tried to restrict
that expression.149 Without an exception, the USOPC’s actions would be
required to be examined under strict scrutiny.150
To pass strict scrutiny, the USOPC needs a compelling state
interest, as well as a narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest.151 It
could be argued that the USOPC’s interest is in the protection of athletes
from sanctions by the IOC, as well as maintaining the neutrality of sport. 152
This interest is not compelling, however, as the sanctions come from the
IOC anyways, rendering the USOPC’s actions moot. 153 Simultaneously,
the USOPC could argue that it has an interest in presenting a common front
to the world: a unified Team USA competing for the prestige and glory of
the United States at the highest level of athletic ability.154 This argument
fails as well, as it would run afoul of Texas v. Johnson and the “bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment”: that the government cannot
146
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (allowing HHS to limit the ability of Title
X funding recipients to engage in abortion-related activities); see also Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001) (invalidating restriction on the use of LSC’s services to
challenge the constitutionality or validity of certain laws).
147 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (restricting abortion-related speech to favor other familyplanning methods).
148 See Legal Serv. Corp., 531 U.S. at 543 (barring restriction on private, government
created, speech); see also IOC ATHLETES’ COMM., supra note 25, at 2 (explaining where
protesting is barred and where it is allowed).
149 See Legal Serv. Corp., 531 U.S. at 538-40 (addressing challenges to restrictions in §
504(a)(16) and creating four categories of prohibited activities).
150 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)
(holding where unconstitutional conditions doctrine is violated strict scrutiny must be applied);
see also McCoy, supra note 42 (providing overview of unconstitutional conditions doctrine
analysis).
151
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 115, 163 (2015) (recent case showing that free
speech restrictions demand a strict scrutiny analysis by a court); see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla.
Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 452-54 (2015) (explaining “narrowly tailored”); Steiner, supra note 87
(showing examples of compelling interests).
152 See generally IOC ATHLETES’ COMM., supra note 25, at 2 (explaining justification).
153 See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 2, at 94 (stating rule 50 and sanctions).
154 See generally Koller, supra note 44, at 1469-86 (exploring the concept of “sportive
nationalism:” the use of sport to promote a nationalist message).
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prohibit the expression of an idea because it may conflict with the ideas and
values of society.155 Akin to the flag in Johnson, the USOPC restricts
speech to maintain an image and prevent an uproar from a certain sect of
society.156 This is completely unrelated to public health, safety, or national
security, and it is unlikely that a court would declare these compelling
interests.157 To hold otherwise would be to allow the state to mandate how
citizens relate to icons or symbols, out of fear of each other.158
If a court were to find that the USOPC’s interest was not
compelling, then the analysis could end here; but if it did find the interest
sufficiently compelling, the court would then examine the narrow tailoring
of the USOPC’s actions.159 For an act to be narrowly tailored, it must be
neither over-inclusive—meaning not so broad as to restrict all manner of
speech—nor under-inclusive—meaning not so riddled with exceptions that
it cannot possibly achieve its desired end.160 A litigant is more likely to
successfully argue that a rule is overinclusive, as the exceptions are few
and far between, and so this note will focus on this argument.161 The
USOPC’s bar on athlete is over-inclusive for two reasons: (1) it anoints
specific places as appropriate for protest, diminishing the value of the
speech to the point where it might not be heard at all; and (2) the IOC’s list
of barred conduct could encompass nearly any kind of speech or protest.162
Without a viable counter argument, it is likely that a court would find such
a contract unconstitutional under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
because the action does not have a compelling interest, and even if there
was one, it is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

155 See Texas v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (articulating bedrock principle
underlying First Amendment)
156 See id. (illustrating restriction’s purpose in Johnson).
157 See Johnson, 419 U.S. at 414 (discussing proper restriction purposes); see also Steiner,
supra note 87 (providing examples of compelling interests).
158 See Johnson, 419 U.S. at 414 (noting SCOTUS denouncing such mandating by
Congress); see also Steiner, supra note 87 (providing examples of compelling interests).
159 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 452-54 (2015) (explaining scope of
“narrowly tailored”); Ruth Ann Strickland, Narrowly Tailored Laws, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ENCYCLOPEDIA (last visited Jan. 31, 2021, 2:47 AM) https://mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/1001/narrowly-tailored-laws (explaining briefly “narrowly tailored”).
160
See Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 452-54 (scope of “narrowly tailored”).
161 See IOC ATHLETES’ COMM., supra note 25, at 2 (explaining Rule 50 meaning and
protests prohibited and locations allowed).
162 See id. (explaining Rule 50 and conduct requirements); cf Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at
452-54 (deciding law barring judges from soliciting campaign donations was narrowly tailored).
The law in question did not have so many exceptions to it as to render it unnecessary and did not
restrict the free speech of judges to the extent that they could not act in a political capacity, rather
it only restricted soliciting campaign donations in the interest of preserving the integrity of the
Florida elected judiciary. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 452-54.
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V. CONCLUSION
The USOPC’s actions run afoul of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine by forcing American athletes to sign away their right to protest in
exchange for participation in international and Olympic events. While the
committee has changed its stance on athlete protest for now, it may reverse
its position, or narrowly construe what it views as a peaceful and respectful
protest. This affords far too much discretion to a private body, especially
one so unregulated and closely tied to the government. While the USOPC
recently chose to stand with its athletes against the IOC, there is nothing
stopping the committee from reverting its stance and siding with its
international counterpart once again. Without a ruling permanently barring
the USOPC from returning to its old pattern of conduct, every future
American athlete is at risk of losing their eligibility at the hands of the
committee and the administration it follows. As such, the action taken
against Race Imboden should be ruled as unconstitutional, and the USOPC
must be stripped of its discretion regarding the enforcement of Rule 50.
The United States has always said it stands for free speech: this should be
especially true when its athletes stand on the Olympic podium.
Leon Rotenstein

